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The role of computer networked operations (CNO) has taken on greater 
importance with the rise of network-centric warfare. Comprised primarily of 
defense, attack, and exploitation, the technological capabilities are growing 
exponentially, as is the rate of data exchange, yet the organizational 
configurations supporting CNO are slow to anticipate and react. This presents a 
serious issue in terms of command and control (C2), as such organizations do 
not fit well with their highly dynamic environments, nor are they suited well to the 
missions and expectations placed upon them. Contingency Theory offers 
excellent potential to inform leaders and policy makers regarding how to bring 
their C2 organizations and approaches into better fit, and hence to improve CNO 
performance. The key research question is, which organizational configurations 
provide the best CNO performance within the network-centric environment? 
Building upon a half century of rich, theoretical and empirical research in 
Contingency Theory, we construct computational models of CNO set within 
different organizational configurations taken from both theory and practice, and 
we employ the method of computational experimentation to examine the 
comparative performance of such different configurations. Results elucidate 
important insights into CNO C2, suitable for immediate policy and operational 
implementation, and expand the growing empirical basis to guide continued 
research along these lines.  
 
                                                 
1 This research is sponsored in part by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Networks and Information Integration, through its Command & Control Research Program and 
the Center for Edge Power at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
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Introduction 
The role of computer networked operations (CNO) has taken on greater 
importance with the rise of network-centric warfare in our offensive capabilities 
and defensive responsibilities (CRS Report to Congress, 2007; Whitehouse, 
1998). Comprised primarily of defense, attack, and exploitation, CNO 
technological capabilities are growing exponentially (United States Army Training 
and Doctrine Command, 2005), as is the rate of data exchange, yet the 
organizational configurations supporting CNO are slow to anticipate and react 
(Bryan, 2003). This presents a serious issue in terms of command and control 
(C2), as such organizations do not fit well with their highly dynamic 
environments, nor are they suited well to the missions and expectations placed 
upon them. Indeed, the Department of Defense (DoD) is grappling with decisions 
concerning the effective organizational structure to conduct CNO. These 
decisions demand a firm grasp of the operational requirements as well as an 
understanding of the CNO mission and organizational design issues. 
Contingency Theory offers excellent potential to inform leaders and policy 
makers regarding how to bring their C2 organizations and approaches into better 
fit, and hence to improve CNO performance. The key research question is, which 
organizational configurations provide the best CNO performance within the 
network-centric environment?  
Drawing from Gateau et al. (2007), we understand how recent advances 
in computational organization theory (e.g., see Burton et al. 2002, Carley and Lin 
1997, Levitt et al. 1999, Lomi & Larsen, 2001) and computational social science 
(see NAACSOS 2007) offer promising potential to address this question. For 
instance, to represent and reason about organizational processes, one can 
conduct computational experiments with levels of rigor and control comparable to 
laboratory experimentation. This can support greater internal validity and 
reliability than is obtainable often through fieldwork. As another instance, 
computational experiments can be conducted to examine myriad different 
organizational designs, including cases that have yet to be implemented in 
physical organizations (Nissen, 2005b). Moreover, mission-environmental 
contexts are not manipulated easily in the field, and laboratory experiments are 
limited generally to micro-level organizational phenomena. 
The present paper represents part five in our campaign of 
experimentation, which began with a paper presented at the 2004 CCRTS 
conference (Nissen and Buettner, 2004). In that paper, the relative advantages 
and disadvantages of computational experimentation were presented, and this 
computational research method was described in terms of a complementary, 
empirical approach. The 2005 ICCRTS paper followed (Nissen, 2005a); it 
compared and analyzed more than 25 diverse organizational forms, including the 
Edge organization, which was shown to be theoretically distinct and uniquely 
differentiated from other organization forms described by prior investigators. This 
2005 paper also offered a theoretical discussion and set of hypotheses about the 
performance of Edge and Hierarchy organization forms under different mission-
environmental conditions, and provided insight into relative characteristics and 
behaviors of Hierarchy and Edge organizations. Then in our 2006 ICCRTS paper 
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(Orr and Nissen, 2006), we expanded the study to specify and model four other, 
classic, theoretically grounded organization forms: Simple Structure, Professional 
Bureaucracy, Divisionalized Form, and Adhocracy (Mintzberg, 1979, 1980). We 
also employed computational experimentation to compare and contrast 
empirically the relative performance of Hierarchy and Edge organizational forms, 
using a multidimensional set of performance measures, under the mission-
environmental conditions at two different points in history: the Industrial Era (e.g., 
characterizing Cold War era missions and environments), and the 21st Century 
(e.g., characterizing Global War on Terror missions and environments). Finally, in 
our 2007 ICCRTS paper (Gateau et al., 2007), we articulated an organizational 
design space for the first time, discussing the model, experimental setup and 
results in considerable detail, as well as offering theoretical implications for the 
organization scholar and actionable guidance for the C2 practitioner. 
Building upon a half century of rich, theoretical and empirical research in 
Contingency Theory—in addition to the campaign outlined above—we construct 
computational models of CNO set within different organizational configurations 
taken from both theory and practice. This enables us to articulate—very clearly 
through semi-formal organizational models—the kinds of organizations, work 
processes, technologies and people associated with CNO today. Using such 
models, we employ the method of computational experimentation to examine the 
comparative performance of different CNO organizational configurations in the 
mission-environmental context of CNO today and tomorrow. The following 
section presents a representative discussion of CNO today, along with key 
concepts from theory. Then we describe our computational model, present the 
results of computational experimentation, and draw final conclusions. 
Background 
We begin with an introduction to computer network operations based on current 
DOD doctrinal definitions. The idea is to present a representative discussion of 
CNO today. We then follow by summarizing briefly the central premise of 




By US doctrine (e.g., Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006), CNO can be viewed best as a 
subcomponent of information operations, which include five capabilities: 
psychological operations, military deception, operational security, electronic 
warfare and CNO (Wilson, 2007). Additionally, CNO can be subdivided further 
into three core components: computer network attack, defense, and exploitation. 
The purpose of CNO is to attack, deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, exploit, and 
defend electronic information and infrastructure and/or enable such activities. 
The electronic information and infrastructure of interconnected computer systems 
are commonly referred to as networks, which are usually part of or connected to 
a larger infrastructure known as the global information grid (GIG). The GIG is the 
                                                 
2 We appreciate the assistance with this section from Carlos Vega, both through his thesis work 
(Vega, 2004) and personal communications (December 2007). 
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globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities and associated 
processes. This includes the human element that enables and orchestrates 
myriad activities associated with information handling and processing. CNO’s 
operating space can encompass any part of the GIG’s end-to-end reach. 
CNO missions are generally multifaceted, and can simultaneously include 
components of attack, defense and exploitation. The operations can be generally 
classified as offensive and defensive in nature. Offensive operations imply 
attacking and exploiting the adversaries’ systems, and protecting (defending) the 
access point or point of intrusion to an adversary’s network, while not 
compromising one’s own network or techniques for intrusion. Defensive 
operations imply protecting one’s own network from an adversary’s attack and 
exploitation attempts. The defense of a network may include active attempts to 
attack and exploit one’s own network to identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities. 
Such active attempts by authorized personnel to attack and exploit a friendly 
network is known as “penetration testing,” not attack or exploitation, although the 
methods and techniques may be similar.  
The present state of CNO and how to organize to manage this capability 
effectively is the subject of much debate currently in the executive branch of 
government (CRS Report to Congress, 2007). While the capabilities are being 
developed, the organizational structure is lagging behind. The United States 
armed forces are organized based on physical places called domains. Different 
services have primary responsibility for each domain: currently the Air Force has 
primary responsibility for the air and space domain; the Navy has the sea; and 
the Army has the land. Clearly, with increasing joint (and coalition) operations, 
various services (and nations) must work together across domains. With the 
advent of the GIG, the US armed forces are considering the extent to which 
cyber should be viewed as a domain (e.g., like air, space, sea or land), or a 
method or weapon (e.g., like airplanes, satellites, ships and tanks) to achieve 
objectives (Bryan, 2003; Department of Defense, 2003; Franz et al., 2007).  
Consider, for instance, how Cyberspace has minimal physical presence, 
and hence can be viewed as a domain separate from its physical counterparts 
(e.g., air and space). Battles were fought only on land and then at sea for 
millennia, but the advent of air warfare in the 20th Century—and space operations 
in the 21st Century—called for new and distinct service responsibilities. New 
cyber responsibilities associated with CNO may call similarly for distinct service 
responsibilities. As another instance, CNO can be compared to the longbow 
weapon prior to the battle of Crécy in 1346. The longbow, a two-centuries-old 
weapon, proved decisive for the English in battle against larger French forces, 
because it was employed via different tactics. Different tactics associated with 
using decades-old networks as weapons may call similarly for decisive use in 
battle (Vega, 2004).  
Theoretical Concepts  
To begin, Leweling and Nissen (2007) explain how, for more than a half century, 
Contingency Theory has retained a central place in organization studies 
research. Beginning with seminal works by Burns and Stalker (1961), Woodward 
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(1965), Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) and others, organization theory has been 
guided by the understanding that no single approach to organizing is best in all 
circumstances. Moreover, myriad empirical studies (e.g., Woodward, 1965; cf. 
Mohr, 1971; Pennings, 1975) have confirmed and reconfirmed that poor 
organizational fit degrades performance, and many diverse organizational forms 
(e.g., Bureaucracy, see Mintzberg 1980; M-Form, see Donaldson, 2001; Clan, 
see Ouchi, 1981; Network, see Miles & Snow, 1978; Platform, see Ciborra, 1996; 
Virtual, see Davidow & Malone, 1992) and configurations (e.g., Machine 
Bureaucracy, Simple Structure, Professional Bureaucracy, Divisionalized Form, 
Adhocracy, see Mintzberg, 1979) have been theorized to enhance fit across an 
array of contingency factors (e.g., age, environment, size, strategy, technology).  
The concept organizational fit describes how well a particular 
organizational form is suited to perform effectively (i.e., fit well) in a particular 
contingency context. For instance, organizational technology and organizational 
environment have been studied extensively as powerful contingency factors 
(e.g., Burns & Stalker, 1961; Harvey, 1968; Galbraith, 1973), with alternate 
technological and environmental characteristics (e.g., comprehensibility, 
predictability, complexity, stability) related contingently with different 
organizational forms (e.g., craft, engineering, see Perrow, 1970). Indeed, 
organization scholars have come to understand well how various organizational 
forms should and do vary to fit diverse environmental contexts. This provides the 
backdrop for our analysis of CNO: we seek to identify the organizational form 
suited best for effective performance. 
Additionally, Orr and Nissen (2006) explain how a small set of theoretical, 
archetypal organization forms offer promise in terms of informing experimentation 
in the context of contingency fit. Following this line of work, we build upon 
Mintzberg’s (1980) five, archetypal organizational configurations: Simple 
Structure, Machine Bureaucracy, Professional Bureaucracy, Divisionalized Form, 
and Adhocracy. The different configurations vary according to the structuring and 
predominance of their organizational parts, coordination mechanisms, design 
parameters, and contingency factors. Further, they are broadly applicable, 
mutually distinct, and derived from both theory and practice. Hence they are 
representative of many contemporary organizations observable in practice today, 
and many of the emerging organizational forms (e.g., strategic alliances, 
networked firms, Edge organizations) can be analyzed as hybrids through 
consideration of their separate parts, mechanisms, parameters and factors.  
Moreover, we include the Edge organization (Alberts and Hayes, 2003) as 
a sixth archetype with particular applicability in the C2 domain (see Nissen, 
2005a, Orr and Nissen, 2006). The Edge shares similarities with the Adhocracy 
(e.g., coordination by mutual adjustment, small unit size, many liaison links 
throughout, selective decentralization), Professional Bureaucracy (e.g., low 
vertical specialization, high training and indoctrination, market and functional 
grouping), and Simple Structure (e.g., low horizontal specialization, low 
formalization), but it also demonstrates several key differences, and does not 
correspond cleanly with any single archetype (e.g., it is characterized as an 
hybrid Professional Adhocracy—a combination of archetypes). Key to Edge 
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characterization is decentralization, empowerment, shared awareness and freely 
flowing knowledge required to push power for informed decision making and 
competent action to the “edges” of organizations (Alberts and Hayes, 2003), 
where they interact directly with their environments and other players in the 
corresponding organizational field (Scott, 2001). In contrast, the Edge 
organization shares almost no similarities with the Machine Bureaucracy (cf. high 
training and indoctrination), the latter to which we refer interchangeably as 
“Hierarchy.” Together, these six archetypes from theory inform our 
experimentation on CNO. 
Research Design  
In this section we focus on Computer Network Defense (CND), and describe a 
grounded model of CND as it is organized and managed today, to guide our 
computational model building. Defense represents a very practical point to being 
an investigation such as this: there is little opportunity to conduct computer 
attacks and exploitations if one’s own defenses are weak, and one’s own network 
is vulnerable. We then represent this grounded model using an agent-based 
modeling environment, and we formulate a second computational model to 
reflect an alternate approach to CND. Subsequently, we describe our experiment 
design to examine the comparative performance of different organizational forms.  
Grounded CND Model 
To understand computer network defense as it exists in the field, we canvassed 
the latest “best practices” gleaned from various online references as well as 
subject matter experts at a major Department of Defense educational institution. 
This immersive online and field research effort allowed us to sample from a wide 
range of computer network organizational approaches (educational, 
governmental, and corporate business). We then used the information gleaned to 
arrive at a general model. This model served as the framework for our agent-
based modeling simulations. 
The model below represents a representative computer network defense 
approach (e.g., organizational structure, task structure, personnel staffing, 
technological infrastructure), which is generalized along lines similar to those 
found in college campuses and like, mid-to-large-scale enterprises. Specifically, 
we based our organization structure and workflow process on a template used by 
the University of California at San Francisco Medical Center. This model was 
then subjected to face validation by various Department of Defense computer 
science instructors.  
A key and recurring emphasis of CND involves responding to hacker 
attacks. There are various methods of categorizing a hacker attack. They 
typically center on one of three main profiles: 1) unauthorized activity on the host 
system; 2) unauthorized attempt to gain access to the host system; and 3) 
anomalies on the host system discovered after the fact (UCSF Medical Center, 
2008). Our workflow process addresses active attempts to gain access to the 
host network. 
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Building upon our discussion above, we use the POW-ER (Projects, 
Organizations, and Work for Edge Research) computational modeling 
environment (e.g., see Gateau et al., 2007) to represent and emulate the 
structure and behavior of current CNO. Focusing on our purpose to test the 
current CNO structure with a decentralized, edge-like structure, we examine a 
specific CND incident: hacker attack. This approach sets common conditions to 
both organizational structures, providing opportunities to examine the behaviors 
of organizational actors performing tasks, and enabling us to represent only the 
most important aspects of the external environment (Simon, 1996).  
In developing this model, we ground our computer representation in 
current practice as well as doctrine (see Figure 1 below). As above, the CND 
organization and task structures for a hacker attack are based on the UCSF 
Medical Center, and are cross-validated by the current CND structure of a major 
DoD educational institution. This provides considerable external validity to our 
models, yet the representations remain at a relatively high level, and hence retain 




Figure 1 Computer Network Operations Organization Diagram 
 
a) Snapshot the System: Make copies of all audit trail information such as 
system log files, the root history files, and like tasks, and get a listing of all 
active network connections.  
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b) Lockout the Hacker: Kill all active processes for the hacker/cracker, and 
remove any files or programs that may have been left on the system. 
Change passwords for any accounts that were accessed by the 
hacker/cracker. 
 
c) Restore the System: Restore the system to a normal stage. Restore any 
data or files that the hacker/cracker may have modified. Install patches or 
fixes to close any security vulnerabilities that the hacker/cracker may have 
exploited. Log all actions taken to restore the system to a normal state in a 
logbook. 
 
d) Report the Incident: The incident should be reported following the 
security incident reporting procedures. 
 
e) Monitoring: There are no set procedures for monitoring the activity of a 
hacker. However, monitored information should be reported in a written log. 
Each incident will be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. The person 
authorizing the monitoring activity should provide direction to those doing 
the monitoring. Once the decision has been made to cease monitoring the 
hacker's activities and have him removed from the system, the steps 
outlined previously (i.e., Removal of Hacker/Cracker) are followed. 
 
 
Figure 2 Distribution of Incidents and Responses 
 
The final step of the hacker removal process (i.e., Monitoring) implies an 
embedded “If-Then-Else” statement that requires attention during the modeling 
phase. Not all hacker activities are alike, and some are considered to be more 
threatening than others are. Hence a decision is made with every intrusion 
whether action should be taken or not. To represent this portion of the process, we 
include a branch that leads to two different organizational responses (i.e., two 
different task sets), depending upon the threat determination. To help ground this 
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model in current practice, we draw from the fourth quarter United States Computer 
Emergency Response Team (US CERT) Trends and Analysis 2007 (see figure 2 
below), which implies that only 16% of hacker/cracker attempts are regarded as 
minor threats (US CERT, 2007), and hence that the remaining 84% require more 
extensive organizational responses.  
Hierarchy CND Computational Model 
Here we describe the Hierarchy CND computational model. Because most CND 
organizations today reflect like hierarchical structure, this model is representative 
of the current, prevailing approach to CND. We first outline briefly the 
specification of this computational model, after which we report simulated 
performance results for the baseline model. To promote continuity and insight, 
the discussion here in the main body of the paper is kept purposefully at a 
relatively high, summary level. 
 
 
Figure 3 Hierarchy CND Computational Model Screenshot 
 
Figure 3 depicts a POW-ER screenshot for a Hierarchy organization as it 
responds to a hacker attack. The hacker attack initially observed by the Log 
Team prompts the middle level managers (Network Response Leader, 
Administration Staff and Surveillance Leader) and the Network Security Officer to 
attend a meeting where they assess the threat associated with each specific 
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hacker attack. If the attack is considered as low threat, and network security is 
considered adequate for this kind of attack, then the hacker is simply monitored 
in order to gather information that can be used in legal actions. Alternatively, if 
the hacker attack is regarded as a serious threat, and network security is 
deemed to be at stake, the hacker is locked out of the system, and the 
organization performs a more extensive set of tasks (e.g., Lockout Hacker, 
Restore System, Report Incident and Monitoring).  
Behind each object in the figure one can view a number of model 
parameters that are set to represent and guide the behavior of the agent-based 
model. We set most of these parameters at empirically determined “normal” 
levels, which reflect organizations in general (Jin and Levitt, 1996; Levitt et al., 
1999; Nissen and Levitt, 2004). The Hierarchy CND organizational structure is 
patterned in particular after relevant, previous work (esp. Looney and Nissen, 
2006; Gateau et al., 2007). Table 1 summarizes the key model parameterization 
for this organization and task structure. The reader interested in details is 
directed to such previous work for elaboration and explanation. This Hierarchy 







Centralization High Low 
Formalization High Low 
Matrix Strength Low High 
Team Experience Low Medium 
Communication Probability 0.10 0.90 




Project Exception Probability 0.10 0.20 
Rework Strength 0.30 0.10 
Meetings 2 hours / day 0 
Position Role ST SL 
Application Experience Medium High 
Organizational Levels 3 1 
Table 1 Summary of Hierarchical and Edge CND Model Parameterization 
Edge CND Computational Model  
Figure 4 depicts a POW-ER screenshot for the Edge CND organization. The 
Edge (Alberts and Hayes, 2003) organization provides vivid contrast to the 
Hierarchy as represented and described above. For direct comparison, the total 
number of personnel and the total effort level and difficulty of tasks are the same 
in both models; that is, we control for these important factors, and vary only the 
organizational form. Notice immediately how the Edge organization lacks the 
management hierarchy delineated above, as leadership is more emergent in 
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Edge organizations, and the Edge model is comprised of more, smaller, 
interdependent teams conducting finer grained sets of tasks. Such tasks are 
performed more in parallel, and are coordinated more via mutual adjustment 
(Thompson, 1967), than their Hierarchy counterparts above are. Also, more 
frequent, lateral communications supplant the meetings prescribed in the 
Hierarchy model above, and working-level actors collaborate through actions to 
address each hacker attack. As noted above, most model parameters remain 
constant across these two organizational forms, and Table 1 above provides 
details of key parameter settings.  
 
 
Figure 4 Edge CND Computational Model Screenshot 
Experiment Design 
In this section we draw from Nissen-Levitt (2004), and build upon Nissen 
(2005b), to describe briefly the computational methods and tools used for 
modeling the CND organization and process. The POW-ER agent based 
modeling application used in this research is version 3.4a, and represents a 
continuation of development (see Looney & Nissen, 2006; Nissen 2005a; Nissen 
2005b). The basic performance and outputs of POW-ER 3.4a have been verified, 
and several key behavioral and performance results (work duration, functional 
risk, project risk) have been validated through our fieldwork on the CNO/CND 
process. Hence we have considerable basis for confidence in the thrust of the 
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results we report. Additionally, all of the comparisons that we make below are 
relative to one another, and control for the same underlying variables and 
behaviors. Hence any bugs or errors inherent in POW-ER 3.4a are controlled 
and applied consistently across all models. Thus, although one or more of the 
absolute results reported may be in some error, the relative results reported—
which comprise the essence of our study—are reported on a consistent basis. 
 We take into account current open-source CNO best, and refine the model 
based upon theoretical inference (Looney & Nissen, 2006; Alberts & Hayes, 
2003), drawing heavily upon the previous works in this campaign of Edge. This 
allows us to model the practical application of modern CNO as it exists today, 
and to develop Edge-like permutations of this baseline. We then subject the 
model to a simulated network penetration in both low- and high-threat operational 
environments. Hence we have a full-factorial, 2 x 3 (i.e., two organizational 
forms, three mission-environmental contexts), computational experiment, which 
is consistent with the conduct of previous experiments in this campaign. The 
interested reader is directed to such prior experiments for details concerning 
model independent and dependent variables. 
More specifically, we examine the performance of each organizational 
form across three mission-environmental contexts. The first reflects the grounded 
model input noted above, in which only 16% of hacker attacks are deemed to be 
serious threats. The low threat model reflects the network being attacked only by 
“amateur” hackers, and the security deemed to provide adequate protection 
against them. The only action taken against hacker attacks is continuing to 
monitor them. Alternatively, the high threat model reflects the network being 
attacked only by “professional” hackers, and the security deemed to provide 
inadequate protection against them. The CND organization locks out every 
hacker. Using a Monte Carlo approach, in which each organization and scenario 
is run 100 times.  
Results 
The simulation results are summarized in Table 3 below. We first compare the 
baseline Hierarchy and Edge results, and then examine their sensitivity to the 
threat level. 
Baseline Comparison 
Beginning with the Hierarchy baseline results that are reported in the first row of 
the table, the CND organization accomplished its network-defense tasks in 5.9 
hours; this is a measure of organizational speed, which is very important in the 
CNO domain. Also, one can see the level of direct work (i.e., planned effort) is 
14.2 person-hours; that is, the equivalent of 14 people working for approximately 
one hour each, or one person working for 14 hours. Rework of 1.3 reflects the 
level of effort (in person-hours also) expended attending to exceptions and 
correcting errors that are made during the CND response. Coordination of 3.3 
reflects the level of effort (again, in person-hours) expended for coordination 
between the various CND organizational actors, and 0.2 person-hours of wait 
time reflect the amount of time that actors spend waiting for decisions to be made 
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and information to be provided. The 12.0 person-hours spent in meetings should 
be self-explanatory, as this represents a key approach to coordination in the 
Hierarchy CND organization. Finally, project risk of 0.2 represents the level of 
effort (in person-hours) that would be required to attend to all of the exceptions 
and correcting all of the errors that were either ignored or addressed 
inadequately. 
 
Table 2 Simulation Performance Results 
Scenario Duration Direct 
Work 






5.9 14.2 1.3 3.3 0.2 12.0 0.2 
Edge 
Baseline 



















5.7 15.2 2.1 5.1 0 0 0.3 
 
For comparison, the Edge requires roughly half an hour less time (5.3 
hours) to accomplish its network-defense tasks, and hence moves somewhat 
more quickly in this mission-environmental context and threat level. This is 
consistent with results in other contexts (e.g., joint task force, see Gateau et al., 
2007; coalition mission planning, see Looney and Nissen, 2006). The Edge also 
involves slightly more direct work (14.6), due to very small differences in 
Hierarchy and Edge model representations, but is negligible in the context of this 
computational experiment. However, it involves a greater level of rework (1.8), 
which indicates that a greater number of exceptions and errors are made and 
corrected by the Edge CND organization than the Hierarchy. The Edge 
organization tends to encounter a greater number of exceptions and make more 
errors generally than the Hierarchy does. Coordination (4.7) is considerably 
greater for the Edge, as actors without a hierarchical organization are required to 
coordinate abundantly and laterally, and Wait Time is zero, as actors in the Edge 
do not have to wait for supervisors to make decisions or provide information. 
Notice also that no meetings take place in the Edge; this explains in part the 
increased coordination load, and reflects the radically different kinds of 
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organizations, with concomitantly different modes of information processing and 
behavior, corresponding to the Hierarchy and Edge. Finally, project risk level 
(0.3) is appreciably higher for the Edge. Hence this organizational form entails 
greater risk than the Hierarchy does. 
To summarize, the Edge CND organization moves more quickly than the 
Hierarchy does, and it involves zero wait time and meetings. However, the Edge 
requires a greater level of rework and a considerably greater coordination load, in 
addition to half again the level of project risk. Hence the CND organization leader 
and policy maker faces a set of tradeoffs: to the extent that organizational speed 
is important, the Edge appears to have an edge over the Hierarchy in this 
context, but to the extent that risk represents a primary concern, the Hierarchy 
represents the sharper organization. Further, the high coordination load 
associated with the meetingless and supervisorless Edge organization suggest 
that this organizational environment may be relatively more stressful for many 
people—particularly those accustomed to working in formal hierarchies—but the 
comparative freedom from bureaucracy and direct supervision may be refreshing 
to many as well. This suggests an opportune area for further research into the 
organizational climate associated with these alternate forms. 
Threat-Level Comparison 
In the low-threat environment, both the Hierarchy and Edge move more quickly 
and involve less effort than in the baseline environment summarized above. 
Indeed, the Hierarchy reduces its duration (5.1) by nearly a whole hour, and both 
rework (0.9) and coordination (3.1) are lower.  However, notice that the wait time 
(1.4) is appreciably greater in this low-threat environment. Even though the task 
environment is comparably simpler than in the baseline context, organizational 
actors spend considerably more time waiting for supervisors to make decisions 
and provide information. This represents a drawback of working in even three-
level hierarchies: busy supervisors act often as metaphorical bottlenecks, and 
are central sources of delay. 
 The Edge moves much more quickly in this low-threat environment than in 
the baseline, as its duration falls to 3.5 hours. Notice that this represents much 
greater speed than the Hierarchy (5.1 hours) in this same environment. The 
Edge also incurs lower levels of both rework (1.4) and coordination (1.4) in this 
comparatively simple task environment, as task interdependencies are not as 
demanding as in the baseline, and the flat Edge organizational structure obviates 
much of the coordination load imposed by the Hierarchy. However, the Edge 
reflects greater risk (0.4) than in the baseline environment, and even more 
pronounced than the case described above, the Edge reflects double the risk of 
the Hierarchy even in this low-threat environment. This may explain in part the 
lower rework and coordination levels: actors in the Edge organization are failing 
to attend to exceptions and correct errors to the same extent; hence residual 
exceptions and errors are reflected in higher risk levels. Here, as above, the CND 
organization leader and policy maker face similar tradeoffs (e.g., speed vs. risk), 
but the differences in relative speeds and risk levels are even more pronounced. 
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 By comparison in the high-threat environment, the Hierarchy moves a bit 
more quickly (5.7 hours) than in the baseline environment summarized above, 
even though it involves more effort (15.0). Here, 100% of attacks are of the high-
threat variety, and this Hierarchy CND organization responds relatively well to 
them. The other performance parameters differ only negligibly from their baseline 
counter parts in the Hierarchy. 
 For the Edge, performance in terms of duration degrades by nearly a half 
hour (5.7) in this high-threat environment, but is equal to that of the Hierarchy; 
hence the two organizational forms are equivalent in terms of speed. Rework 
(2.1) and coordination (5.1) both increase in this environment, and both appear to 
increase beyond baseline levels by greater margins than reflected in the 
Hierarchy performance statistics; that is, the Hierarchy appears to be more 
resilient to a shift to the high-threat environment than the Edge is. 
 Also as above, the CND organization leader and policy maker face 
tradeoffs, but the relative speeds are equivalent across both organizational 
forms, so the lower risk level associated with the Hierarchy makes it appear to be 
a superior approach in this high-threat environment. Figure 5 illustrates the 






















Figure 5 Project Risk 
 
 In Figure 6 we present a plot of the project risk and duration values 
summarized and discussed above. This helps to delineate the key tradeoffs 
faced by CND organization leaders and policy makers. The horizontal axis 
represents the duration corresponding to each organization and threat level, and 
the vertical axis represents the associated risk level. Each organization and 
threat level point is labeled in the diagram. For instance, the label “HB” 
corresponds to the Hierarchy organization and baseline threat level that is plotted 
at the duration (5.9) and risk (0.2) point in the diagram. Likewise, the label “EB” 
corresponds to the Edge organization and baseline threat level that is plotted at 
the duration (5.3) and risk (0.3) point in the diagram; “HL” depicts the Hierarchy 
organization and low threat level; “EL” depicts the Edge organization and low 
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threat level; “HH” ” depicts the Hierarchy organization and high threat level; and 
“EL” depicts the Edge organization and high threat level. 
 Notice that, as summarized in tabular form above, the Hierarchy exhibits 
consistently lower risk levels than the Edge does, but aside from the high-threat 
case, the Edge exhibits consistently lower duration than the Hierarchy does. As 
noted above, where risk represents the predominate concern, the Hierarchy 
appears as the clear choice of organizational form. Alternatively, where duration 
represents the predominate concern, the Edge appears as a marginally better 
choice in the baseline case, yet this nonhierarchical form represents a 
considerably superior form in the low-threat case, even though it offers no speed 
advantage where the threat level is deemed to be high. Hence CND organization 
leaders and policy makers will need to assess the anticipated threat level 
associated with a particular mission-environmental context, and they will need to 
determine, in each such context, whether speed or risk represents the 

























Figure 6 Risk vs. Duration Plot 
 
Consistent with the predictions and empirical support of Contingency 
Theory, the “best” CND organizational form depends: it depends upon the 
mission-environmental context, and it depends upon whether speed or risk 
represents the predominate focus in terms of organizational performance. We 
summarize these contingent results via the Organizational Fit Matrix presented in 
Table 3. As noted above, where the threat is low, and leaders and policy makers 
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deem speed to be the predominate focus, the Edge represents the superior 
organizational form. Alternatively, where the threat is low, but leaders and policy 
makers deem risk to be the predominate focus instead, the Hierarchy represents 
the superior form. Likewise where the threat is high, and leaders and policy 
makers deem risk to be the predominate focus, the Hierarchy represents the 
superior form in this case also. An interesting case arises where the threat is 
high, but leaders and policy makers deem speed to be the predominate focus: 
here the Hierarchy and Edge reflect equivalent performance in terms of duration, 
so without specific regard to risk, either form would represent and equivalently 
superior choice, in a classic case of equifinality.  
 
Table 3 Organizational Fit Matrix 
  
 






Speed Edge Either form 
Risk Hierarchy Hierarchy 
 
Nonetheless, because the Hierarchy matches the speed of the Edge, yet 
offers lower risk in this high-threat environment, it represents the superior form. 
Thus, in the CND organizational context, leaders and managers would tend to 
organize hierarchically unless the threat level is deemed to be relatively, in which 
case the Edge would represent the superior organizational form. Determining the 
likely threat levels associated with the myriad, diverse CND organizations in 
practice represents an obvious follow-on study to the research described in this 
article. Such study is likely to suggest that, indeed, one size does not fit all: each 
CND organization should have the latitude to determine its own structure 
depending upon the focus of leaders and policy makers and the anticipate threat 
level.  
Given what we have observed of Military leaders and policy makers to 
date, the bias will be clearly toward homogenization of organization; that is, most 
leaders and policy makers, uncomfortable with the prospect of different 
organizational forms—despite the benefits in terms of fit and hence 
performance—will likely take the naïve path, and dictate uniform organization for 
all, despite the contingent performance degradation associated with such 
homogenization approach. Further, given that the Hierarchy represents the 
predominate and familiar organization form in the Military today, the bias will be 
clearly toward this form—again, despite the benefits in terms of fit and hence 
performance.  
All that we as informed researchers can do is to caution such leaders and 
policy makers against relenting to their biases, and to encourage them to at lease 
experiment with alternate organizational forms where threat levels are 
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determined to be low. After all, where threat levels are low, there is little risk is 
trying a different organizational form, and where the magnitudes and kinds of 
performance benefits suggested by this study obtain, such leaders and policy 
makers would be demonstratively short-sighted not to at least try something new, 
different and hypothetically better. Assessing the comparative performance of 
alternate CND organizational forms in the field represents an exciting and 
important subsequent step for this research campaign. 
Conclusion 
The role of computer networked operations (CNO) has taken on greater 
importance with the rise of network-centric warfare. Comprised primarily of 
defense, attack, and exploitation, the technological capabilities are growing 
exponentially, as is the rate of data exchange, yet the organizational 
configurations supporting CNO are slow to anticipate and react. This presents a 
serious issue in terms of command and control (C2), as such organizations do 
not fit well with their highly dynamic environments, nor are they suited well to the 
missions and expectations placed upon them. Contingency Theory offers 
excellent potential to inform leaders and policy makers regarding how to bring 
their C2 organizations and approaches into better fit, and hence to improve CNO 
performance. The key research question is, which organizational configurations 
provide the best CNO performance within the network-centric environment? 
Building upon a half century of rich, theoretical and empirical research in 
Contingency Theory, we construct computational models of CNO set within 
different organizational configurations taken from both theory and practice, and 
we employ the method of computational experimentation to examine the 
comparative performance of such different configurations. Focusing in particular 
on CND, we develop computational models to represent both the predominate 
Hierarchy and novel Edge organizational forms, and we examine their relative 
performance across three different threat levels posed by hackers: 1) a baseline 
level corresponding to that common in CNO today; 2) a low-threat level 
associated generally with “amateur” hackers; and 3) a high-threat level 
associated instead with “professional” hackers. Because these models are 
developed with the externally validated POW-ER organizational modeling and 
simulation environment, and because we have grounded our CND models using 
operational organizations in practice today, we can assert considerable 
confidence in the empirical results of this investigation. 
Results elucidate important insights into CNO C2, suitable for immediate 
policy and operational implementation. For instance, we reveal how CND leaders 
and policy makers face tradeoffs between counterbalancing performance 
interests (esp. speed and risk), and we show how such tradeoffs are sensitive to 
the threat level associated with any particular CND organization’s mission-
environmental context. This results is new knowledge to guide such leaders and 
policy makers, which we summarize both graphically and tabularly to focus upon 
the key tradeoffs and correspondingly superior organizational forms. This 
expands the growing empirical basis to guide continued research along these 
lines, and it enables leaders and policy makers to move forward immediately, 
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informed by science supporting the use of different organizational forms in 
different mission-environmental contexts. We welcome the opportunity to pursue 
the obvious follow-on research opportunities emanating from this study, and we 
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